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Takeovers and Incidental Protection
of Minority Shareholders
by
Jonathan Mukwiri*
One of the features of takeover law is the protection of minority shareholders. This article
examines the extent at which the protection of minority shareholders is an objective of EU
law, comparing certain provisions in the Takeover Directive with their equivalent in English
law. The arguments advanced in this article are threefold. First, English law offers better
protection to minority shareholders than accorded under EU law. Second, that the protection
accorded to minority shareholders under EU law is only incidental to the objective of facil-
itating the restructuring of companies. Third, that in seeking to achieve a restructuring of
companies objective, both EU law and English law on takeovers trumps property rights of
minority shareholders. The article draws a conclusion that the protection of minority share-
holder in takeovers is about market fairness and not legal rights.
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I. Introduction
This article examines the extent to which the Takeover Directive protects the
interests of minority shareholders who are affected by a takeover bid. It argues
that the protection of minority shareholders during takeovers within the EU
legal framework on takeovers is only incidental to achieving economic growth
* Lecturer in Commercial Law, Durham University. The author is grateful to Christian
Witting, Mathias Siems and Heribert Hirte for their very useful comments on an earlier
draft. Responsibility for errors and omissions remains with the author.
in the EU. This economic growth is achieved through the aim of creating an
internal market as an area without internal frontiers in which freedom of
establishment of companies and free movement of capital is ensured.1 One
way of facilitating these twin freedoms is to facilitate corporate restructuring
through regulation of takeovers. To that end, one of the objectives of the
Takeover Directive is ‘to prevent patterns of corporate restructuring within
the Community from being distorted by arbitrary differences in governance
and management cultures.’2 At EU level, minority protection is hence a meth-
od for achieving corporate restructuring objective.
At EU level, unfair treatment of minority shareholders is therefore a barrier to
restructuring of companies. The lack of a level playing field creates this unfair-
ness, which the law must seek to remove. With lack of level playing field,
shareholders from different Member States did not have equivalent opportu-
nities to sell their shares, and takeovers could not be launched with the same
expectation of success in different Member States.3 To facilitate restructuring
of companies, investors must be free to put their money into shares of EU
companies in order to establish themselves in another Member State and to
provide necessary capital for the development and expansion of those compa-
nies.4 To this end, the Winter Report proposed that a level playing field must
respect the principles of shareholder decision-making and of proportionality
between risk-bearing capital and control.5 These principles are contained in
the Takeover Directive as board neutrality and break-through rules.6 This
article argues that the Takeover Directive’s protection of minority sharehold-
ers is not a protection for their own sake, but is merely incidental to the
objective of facilitating EU-wide corporate restructuring.
One of the features of takeover law is the protection of minority shareholders.
The extent at which the protection of minority shareholders is an objective of
EU law on takeovers is the subject of this article. In this examination, the
article compares certain provisions of the Takeover Directive with their equiv-
alent in English law. The arguments advanced in this article are threefold. First,
that English law on takeovers offers better protection to minority sharehold-
1 Article 26 of TFEU (ex Article 14 TEC).
2 Recital 3, Directive 2004/25/EC; the Takeover Directive is based on Article 50 of TFEU
(ex Article 44 TEC).
3 JL Hansen, ‘When Less Would Be More: The EU Takeover Directive in its Last Appa-
rition’ (2003) 9 Columbia Journal of European Law 275, 280.
4 CM Schmitthoff, ‘The Future of the European Company Law Scene’ in CM Schmitthoff
(ed) The Harmonization of European Company Law (London: UKNCCL, 1973) 7.
5 European Commission, ‘Report of The High Level Group of Company Law Experts on
Issues Related to Takeover Bids’ (Brussels 10 January 2002) – herein referred to as the
“Winter Report.”
6 Articles 9 and 11 of the Takeover Directive.
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ers than accorded under EU law on takeovers. Second, that the protection
accorded to minority shareholders under EU law is only incidental to the
objective of facilitating the restructuring of companies. Third, that in seeking
to achieve the objective of restructuring of companies, both EU law and
English law on takeovers trumps property rights of minority shareholders.
It is argued that minority shareholder protection in takeovers is about market
fairness and not legal rights.
The article proceeds in the following way. First, it examines the cornerstone of
takeover regulation in both English law and EU law, discussing rule 21 of the
City Code and Article 9 of the Takeover Directive, respectively. Secondly, it
discusses thesubtleemphasisoncorporate restructuringobjectiveasopposedto
minority shareholder protection objective, in EU takeover law, looking specif-
ically at the mandatory bid and equal treatment rules. Thirdly, it discusses the
extent at which the squeeze-out or/and compulsory acquisition provisions in
takeoversor/and in company law trumpminority shareholders’ property rights
and the indifferent law’s response of offering to facilitate market fairness as a
remedy to such shareholders. Lastly, it makes concluding remarks.
II. Board neutrality and shareholder empowerment
The Takeover Directive governs activities of takeovers in the EU.7 The inci-
dental protection of minority shareholders within the legal framework of the
Takeover Directive is best understood from an historical perspective. As the
Takeover Directive attempted to harmonise rules regarding an activity that
predominantly occurs within the UK, the mischief it sought to address is also
best understood from the UK historical perspective.
The rules on takeovers in the UK can be traced from the 1960s, and its history
is well documented.8 In the late 1950s there were mounting concerns about
unfair practices in the conduct of takeover offers. These unfair practices were
mainly characterised by defensive measures adopted by offeree boards and
aimed at frustrating takeover bids. The real losers in these practices were the
minority shareholders, as often they were not consulted or given the oppor-
tunity to decide on the bids. English company law was unhelpful to the ag-
grieved minority shareholders in challenging company directors who frus-
trated the bids, as directors owe their duties to the company and not to
shareholders.9 As long as, or at least purportedly, the directors acted in the
7 The Takeover Directive 2004/25/EC [2004] OJ L142/12.
8 See R Falkner, ‘Judicial review of the takeover Panel and self-regulatory organisations’
(1987) 2 Journal of International Banking Law 103, 104–105.
9 Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421
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interest of the company as a whole,10 they were entitled to resist any attempts
of a takeover.
It is against these unfair practices that minority protection was devised via the
rules on takeovers. By 1959, a solution to these unfair practices was found
through the requirements of the ‘Notes on Amalgamation of British Busi-
nesses,’ a measure introduced by the Issuing Houses Association. The rules
in these ‘Notes’ were revised in 1963 to cater for equal treatment in requiring
the offeror to make equivalent offers to other classes of shareholders whose
shares had not been purchased after a certain controlling stake had been ob-
tained. As these measures under the ‘Notes’ were still inadequate to protect
shareholders, the Takeover Panel was set up in March 1968, and a City Code
on takeovers was drawn up in 1985. One of the key aims of UK takeover
regulation is the protection of minority shareholders.11 This is achieved
through the purpose of the City Code, which is to ‘ensure that shareholders
in an offeree company are treated fairly and are not denied an opportunity to
decide on themerits of a takeover.’12 The central feature of the City Code is the
board neutrality rule, which empowers shareholders to take decisions on take-
over offers.
A brief history of rule on takeovers at EU level indicates that the Takeover
Directive began life as a model of the UK regulatory system. In 1974, Pro-
fessor Robert Pennington,13 having been appointed by the Commission to
write a report on takeovers in Europe, produced a report on TakeoverOffers,14
with a draft takeover directive attached, which had been modelled on the UK’s
City Code, with a heavy UK influence. It then took thirty years of negotia-
tions, characterised by drawbacks, frustration, opposition and compromises,
to adopt the Takeover Directive. The controversial provisions were the man-
datory bid and the board neutrality rules, whichweremainly influenced by the
UK and were designed to break down the laws of Germany, the Netherlands,
and other continental European countries that were hostile to takeovers.15 The
10 The phrase “company as a whole” is controversially attributed to shareholders or the
commercial entity.
11 J Payne, ‘Minority shareholder protection in takeovers: A UK perspective’ (2011)
ECFR 145, 155.
12 The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (10th edition, 2011) A1 paragraph 2 (a).
13 Professor Sir Robert Pennington (1927–2008) was a renowned English company law
expert – see J Gill, ‘Obituary: Robert R Pennington’ (2008) The Times Higher Educa-
tion, 27 March.
14 European Commission, ‘Report on Takeover Offers and Other Offers’, Document XI/
56/74; see also KJ Hopt, ‘Takeover regulation in Europe – The battle of the 13th
directive on takeovers’ (2002) 15 Aust JCL 1, 8.
15 KJ Hopt, ‘Takeover regulation in Europe – The battle for the 13th directive on take-
overs’ (2002) 15 Aust JCL 1, 9; see also Heribert Hirte, Commentary on the German
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final version of the Takeover Directive, modelled on the City Code, was
adopted in 2004, to take the English style of minority protection across the
EU.
Taking an English style of minority protection in takeovers across the EU via
the Takeover Directive was not without controversy. The controversy, and
indeed the problem, were due to and still lies in the Takeover Directive’s aim of
introducing into Member States the corporate culture of other Member
States.16 For example, whilst the UK was used to the idea of a mandatory
bid, Germany was not,17 yet the Takeover Directive took the course of intro-
ducing a mandatory bid provision. The German reluctance to accept the man-
datory bid rule was based on the argument that the Takeover Directive does
not per se favour minority shareholders as does the German law of groups of
companies (Konzernrecht). As a general distinction, the mandatory bid pro-
tects shareholders prior to the takeover (ex ante), as an exit strategy, whereas
the German Konzernrecht, which also deals with fiduciary duties, protects
minority shareholders after the bid has been successful (ex post) – neither of
the two models works perfectly, and thus, effective minority shareholder
protection would require both forms of protection; which is the very result
of the German setting in which the Konzernrecht is not preempted by EU
takeover law.18 The Takeover Directive aims at ‘making takeover safeguards
equivalent throughout the Community;’19 and ‘protecting the interests of
holders of the securities of companies governed by the law ofMember Sates.’20
To this end, the Takeover Directive seeks ‘to prevent patterns of corporate
restructuring within the Community from being distorted by arbitrary differ-
ences in governance andmanagement cultures.’21Whereas achieving this lies in
the Takeover Directive’s two key provisions of the board neutrality rule and
breakthrough rule,22 these provisions are optional to Member States under
Article 12.
Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (WpÜG), 2010, Introduction, marginal no. 66
and – with criticism towards the final version of the Directive sec.33 marginal no. 12 et
seq. (with regard to the board neutrality rule).
16 M O’Neill, ‘When European integration meets corporate harmonisation’ (2000) 21 Co
Law 173, 175.
17 JA Faylor, ‘Germany: A legal guide’ (1998) IFLR 34, 35 – notes that Germany was
opposed to the inclusion of a mandatory bid provision (now Article 5 of the Takeover
Directive), on grounds that their Stock Corporation Act [Aktiengesetz] was sufficient
to protect shareholders otherwise for which a mandatory bid was sought.
18 See Heribert Hirte, Commentary on the German Securities Acquisition and Takeover
Act (WpÜG), 2010, Introduction, marginal no. 79 a.
19 Recital number 1 of the Takeover Directive.
20 Recital number 2 of the Takeover Directive.
21 Recital number 3 of the Takeover Directive.
22 Articles 9 and 11 of the takeover Directive, respectively.
ECFR 3/2013Jonathan Mukwiri436
Rule 21 of the UK’s City Code prohibits company directors from taking any
action that would frustrate a takeover bid, in the event of an offer or imminent
offer,without prior authorisation of shareholders. This is enshrined inArticle 9
of the Takeover Directive, which facilitates transparency by vesting the power
of decision-making in the shareholders. As directors are traditionally answer-
able to the company and not to shareholders, their decisions during a takeover
bid could be questionable as towhether they are in the interest of shareholders.
As such, ensuring protection of the interests of shareholders, Article 9 pre-
cludes directors from taking any action, or decision which would otherwise
frustrate a bid.
Company law generally gives power of decision-making to shareholders by
means of a vote in the general meeting. Takeover regulation takes the same
approach when it requires that directors should seek shareholders’ approval in
a general meeting before adopting measures or actions that may frustrate a
takeover bid. The need to defer decision-making on the merits of a takeover
bid to shareholders was also supported by the Winter Report.23 In tightening
the empowering of shareholders, theWinter Report recommended that boards
should not use shareholders’ decisions taken prior to a bid to frustrate a bid.
Only when a bid is actually announced, and the shareholders can really assess
relevant information, can they in fairness be asked to decide whether this
takeover bid should be frustrated by the board or not.24 The Winter Report
suggested that the board should not take steps to favour a bid that in any way
pre-empts the right of shareholders to reject it – in other words, shareholders
must have the final word on the outcome of a takeover bid.25 The Takeover
Directive adopts the spirit of the Winter Report on the question of pre-bid
versus post-bid decisions. This paternalistic approach to shareholder protec-
tion would give greater protection to minority shareholders.
In requiring boards to use shareholders’ post-bid decisions, theWinter Report
seems to have taken the view that shareholders can only fairly decide on the
merits of a takeover bid once they are actually faced with one. On the reason-
ing that this assumes that shareholders are too confused or disinterested to
calculate the risk of their pre-bid decision, it has been questioned why then
assume that shareholders are sufficiently competent to make decisions on
defensive tactics in the post-bid period, and hence the assumption criticised
as too sweeping.26 Another view is to treat this as a paternalistic approach
23 A report by Jaap Winter, that is: European Commission, ‘Report of the High Level
Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for Company
Law in Europe’ (Brussels, 4 November 2002).
24 Winter Report, 2002, Recommendation 1.2.
25 Winter Report, 2002, 27.
26 Allen Ferrell, ‘Why Continental European Takeover Law Matters’ In: Ferrarini and
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designed to protect minority shareholders who may lack full information
during the pre-bid period. The approach would empower minority sharehold-
ers to participate in post-bid period, whilst protecting the majority from giv-
ing the board a blank cheque. Although the majority shareholders should be
free to make decisions that are potentially detrimental to them, even if ex post
shareholders would not find it in their interest for the board to interfere with
the acceptance of the bid,27 shareholders’ defensive decision taken in the pre-
bid period would weaken market confidence and in effect amount to an early
defeat of the main objective of corporate restructuring at EU level.
Thus, a strict application of Article 9, equivalent to the long-standing provi-
sion of the UK’s City Code,28 facilitates corporate restructuring at EU level,
and creates market confidence whilst empowering minority shareholders. At
UK level, this central feature of the City Code has always had the effect of
limiting defensive tactics such that management would not appeal to share-
holder loyalty or patriotism or use their own resources to buy target company
shares in the market.29 As residual beneficiaries of the company assets, com-
bined with the common law requirement that decisions be take for a proper
purpose,30 it is sensible to vest decision-making ultimately with the share-
holders. At EU level, the cornerstone of shareholder protection is Article 9,
which prohibits boards from taking decisions that would frustrate the bid, and
empowers shareholders to make the decisions on the bids. While uncontro-
versial to British eyes accustomed to the City Code, Article 9 would have had
the effect of changing the centre of gravity of more managerialist and stake-
holder-orientated systems of corporate governance, but for the compromises
that reduced it to an optional provision.31 Instead of making mandatory the
board neutrality rule, a long-standing central feature of UK takeover rules, to
better protect shareholders across the EU, the Takeover Directive waters it
down by making it optional. Thus, the UK rules offer a better protection to
minority shareholders than the EU law on takeovers.
From a British perspective, we could conclude that subjecting Article 9 of the
Takeover Directive to optional arrangements fails to remove the unfair prac-
others (eds) Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe (OUP, Oxford 2004)
561, 573.
27 P O Mulbert, ‘Make it or break it: the break-through rule as a break-through for the
European takeover Directive?’ in G Ferrarini and others (eds)Reforming Company and
Takeover Law in Europe (OUP, Oxford 2004) 711, 724–725.
28 Rule 21(1) of the City Code.
29 PLDavies, ‘The Regulation of Defensive Tactics in the United Kingdom and the United
States’ in Hopt and Wymeersh, European Takeovers (Butterworths, London 1992) 200.
30 Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821.
31 A Johnston, ‘The European Takeover Directive: Ruined by protectionism or respecting
diversity’ (2004) 25 Co Law 270.
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tices and therefore the Takeover Directive fails to protect shareholders. Eilis
Ferran has therefore commented that ‘the Takeover Directive in its final form
is an embarrassment for the EU: so much time and effort spent to achieve so
little.’32 By making its core optional, the Takeover Directive was doomed ab
initio to fail in both the method (the protection of shareholders) of achieving
and its intended objective (the restructuring of companies). With Article 9 left
optional, such ‘optionality device ends up setting forth (or, better, tolerating) a
Babel-like system for takeover defences around the various national legisla-
tions.’33 But with need to compromise, making certain provisions optional was
‘the only practical way to ensure that the rules in question, which might be
capable of benefiting a large number of firms, become law.’34
But the compromised Takeover Directive is still workable. Firstly, at EU level,
it is here argued, protection of minority shareholders is only incidental to
achieving the objective of facilitating corporate restructuring. As to the ob-
jective of restructuring of companies, an opt-out does not entail derogation
from the fundamental freedom of establishment.35 Secondly, the optional ar-
rangement of Article 9 is mitigated by the general principle of Article 3(1)(c),
which requires that the offeree board must act in ‘the interest of the company
as a whole’ and must not deny the shareholders the opportunity to decide on
the bid.36 This means that, in the case of a national or corporate opt-out, the
board of the company should obstruct only inadequate offers and should not
frustrate adequate bids or deprive shareholders the opportunity to decide on
the merits of adequate bids.37 Thus, it is here argued, the Takeover Directive,
whilst primarily pursuing the objective of freedom of establishment of com-
panies and free movement of capital, it is nonetheless capable of, albeit inci-
dentally, protecting minority shareholders.
32 E Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2004) 117.
33 M Gatti, ‘Optionality Arrangements and Reciprocity in the European Takeover Direc-
tive’ (2005) 6 EBOR 553, 567.
34 JA McCahery and EPM Vermeulen, ‘The case against reform of the Takeover Bids
Directive’ (2011) 22 EBL Rev 541, 550.
35 DAWyatt, ‘Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Freedoms and the Rights to Equality
after Viking andMangold, and the Implications for Community Competence’ (2008) 4
Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 1, 47.
36 The phrase ‘interests of the company as whole’ in the context of the Takeover Directive
is not a reference to ‘shareholders’ but to the company as an enterprise – see B Sjafjell,
‘The Core of Corporate Governance: Implications of the Takeover Directive for Cor-
porate Governance in Europe’ (2011) 22 EBL Rev 641, 645–652; concerning this pro-
vision, see also Heribert Hirte, Commentary on the German Securities Acquisition and
Takeover Act (WpÜG), 2010, sec. 33 marginal no. 13.
37 Thomas Papadopoulos, EU Law and the Harmonization of Takeovers in the Internal
Market (Kluwer Law International, 2010) 210.
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However, certain provisions primarily aimed at restructuring of companies are
not capable of furthering the protection of minority shareholders. One of
these provisions is the Takeover Directive’s break-through rule under Ar-
ticle 11, based on the principle of proportionality between risk-bearing capital
and control. By this rule, if following a bid, the offeror holds 75 per cent or
more of the capital carrying voting rights, no restrictions on the transfer of
shares or on voting rights nor any extraordinary rights of shareholders con-
cerning the appointment or removal of board members provided for in the
articles of association of the offeree company shall apply. The principle behind
Article 11 is the realisation that, if restructuring of companies and capital
markets are to be facilitated, entrenched company rights must give way. The
principle is not novel in English company law, but seems too radical and
hardly a minority protection provision to the extent that it expropriates rights
secured by shareholders. In comparison, the German Federal Constitutional
Court allows an exproriation of shareholders’ rights only in return for fair
compensation.38
English company law in general has always sought to achieve a balance
between the rights secured by shareholders as a reflection of their bargains,
and the economical need to remove barriers that stifle the expansion of
company business. Company law provides a mechanism for altering the
articles.39 The alteration must be for the benefit of shareholders.40 Where
the rights are class rights, including multiple-voting rights attached to par-
ticular shares, company law provides a particular mechanism for altering such
rights.41 Minority shareholders who have certain rights entrenched in the
articles of association, such as the right to appoint a director, are particularly
protected in company law.42 Where the rights cannot be altered by other
mechanisms, company law provides a compromise arrangement that involves
the holders of the rights and the courts.43 What the Takeover Directive re-
quires in Article 11 is a radical approach that cuts through and ignores mi-
nority protection provisions in English company law. However, Article 11 is
38 See the judgment BVerfGE 27. 4. 1999 – 1 BvR 1613/94, E 100, 289 and the preceding
judgment 7. 8. 1962 – 1 BvL 16/60, E 14, 263.
39 Section 21 Companies Act 2006 – at least 75 per cent of the shareholders must agree to
the alteration.
40 Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa [1900] 1 Ch 656;Greenhalgh v Ardene Cinemas Ltd
[1950] 2 All ER 1120.
41 Section 630 Companies Act 2006 – requires consent of at least 75 per cent of the affected
shareholders.
42 Cumbrian Newspapers Ltd v Cumberland &Westmoreland Printing Ltd [1987] Ch 1 –
a minority shareholder holding only 10 per cent of the shares successfully claimed class
right to appoint a director.
43 Section 895 Companies Act 2006 – requires meetings with the holders of the rights, and
approval by the courts of the compromise reached with holders of those rights.
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optional for Member States,44 and the UK opted out of it.45 But for being
optional, Article 11 furthers a corporate restructuring objective.
III. Mandatory bid principle and shareholder protection
In protecting minority shareholders from unfair practices during a takeover
bid, takeover law provides for a mandatory bid to foster a level playing field of
share deals. This though largely furthers the corporate restructuring objective
for financially sound bidder. But besides a corporate restructuring objective,
there is arguably a share value to be gained by the minority shareholders in
tendering their shares once a mandatory bid is triggered. It is said that in
continental European market, private benefits of control are higher for the
selling controller than for acquiring controller. This is because in family con-
trolled companies, ‘reputation benefits . . . are of primary importance . . . are
hardest to transfer to another owner, because they take time to build, are
owner-specific, and in many cases require family or at least geographical
membership.’46 As such, in private family controlled companies, minority
shareholders would be better off tendering their shares to the new controller
to avoid post-bid decreasing share value.
The mandatory bid rule originated in the UK in 1968, and as takeover activity
increased in Continental Europe during the 1980s, other countries began to
adopt mandatory bid rules, modelling theirs after the UK’s.47 The mandatory
bid principle is aimed at protecting the minority shareholder in share deals.
The Takeover Directive requires that once the offeror has gained a certain
threshold of control of the offeree company, the offeror must make a man-
datory bid ‘as a means of protecting the minority shareholders of that com-
pany.’48 In the UK, this is implemented by section 943 of the Companies Act
2006, which essentially gives effect to the relevant rules of the City Code.49
The threshold triggering a mandatory bid in the UK is 30 per cent.50 The aims
44 Article 12 of the Directive makes Article 11 (and Article 9) optional.
45 Sections 966–972 Companies Act 2006 – but allows companies to opt in to Article 11
should they wish to.
46 OEhrhardt and ENowark, ‘Private Benefits andMinority Shareholder Expropriation –
Empirical Evidence from IPOs of German Family-Owned Firms’ (March 22, 2002,
CFS Working Paper No. 2001/10).
47 J Grant, T Kirchmaier and JA Kirshner, ‘Financial tunnelling and the mandatory bid
rule’ (2009) EBOR 233, 235–236.
48 Article 5 Takeover Directive.
49 Rule 9 of the City Code.
50 Rule 9 of the City Code provides two situations: (a) acquiring shares which carry 30%
or more of the voting rights, and (b) a holder of between 30% and 50% who acquires
additional shares increasing voting rights.
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of the mandatory bid rule are twofold: preventing arbitrary control on acquis-
ition and preventing unfair treatment of shareholders during acquisition.
On one hand, the mandatory bid rule aims at preventing clusters of share
purchases that would transfer control in the target company thereby locking
in shareholders without being offered an opportunity to decide on such con-
trol. In this regard, the rationale behind the mandatory bid is often said to be
the protection of minority shareholder from potential adverse activities of the
new controlling shareholder. To that argument, the minority would be willing
to sell his shares at the price offered, in order to exit the company. This, it is
said, is due to the minority shareholders’ finding themselves in a company,
where the danger of exploitation of resources for private interest is graver, and
corporate policy is going to be unilaterally determined by the new controlling
shareholder.51 It is argued that, rather than policing the behaviour of the new
controlling shareholder, the mandatory bid provides a remedy for the minor-
ity shareholders by allowing them to exit the company in advance.52
As an exit remedy forminority shareholders, themandatory bidmay eliminate
opportunistic acquirers, as it forces the offeror to pay a premium to gain
control. The rule may prevent ‘looters’ who are interested in short-term in-
vestment whilst enabling long-term investors who are willing to pay an exit
price tominority shareholders to acquire control. But whilst the rule may have
a preventive effect as regards to out right ‘looters,’ if the potential gain from
looting is regarded as large enough, the takeover may be carried out anyway.53
Regardless of whether the new controller is a looter or honest long-term
investor, the rule seeks to provide a fair exit price to the minority shareholder.
The rule is here concerned with market fairness.
On the other hand, the mandatory bid rule aims at preventing the offering of
different levels of share prices without extending the same price to all share-
holders. In this regard, the rule protects the minority shareholders by ensuring
that they receive the control premium. As the offeror holdingmore than 30 per
cent is required to bid for all the shares, acquiring shares becomes expensive
and only a financially sound bidder pursues the bid. The rule requires an
equitable price to be extended to all remaining shareholders, which is deter-
mined by reference to the highest price paid in the previous 12 months.54 This
price takes into account the price paid for private purchases so that the minor-
51 G Psaroudakis, “The Mandatory Bid and Company Law in Europe” (2010) ECFR 550,
552.
52 G Psaroudakis, “The Mandatory Bid and Company Law in Europe” (2010) ECFR 550,
554.
53 B Sjafjell, ‘The Core of Corporate Governance: Implications of the Takeover Directive
for Corporate Governance in Europe’ (2011) 22 EBL Rev 641, 697.
54 Article 5 of the Takeover Directive.
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ity is able to benefit from the premium even where the minority had been
bypassed via a private transaction within the period.
The criterion for determining an equitable price is one of the legacy recom-
mendations of the Winter Report. In recommending this criterion, the Winter
Report sought to enable efficient functioning of capital markets in the EU by
providing a sufficient degree of predictability as to the consideration to be
offered in a mandatory bid.55 By means of this criterion, an offeror is able to
predict how much he will pay for the shares, and the shareholders are able to
predict how much to expect. Thus, on one hand the rule prevents arbitrary
control in the company against interests of other investors, and on the other
hand it prevents unfair treatment of shareholders.
However, the very rule is capable of escalating arbitrary control, as uncertainty
increases when shareholders are lured by the offer andmany shareholders give
in rendering the others minority and making shareholding for such minority
less attractive. Take for example under the UK’s threshold of 30 per cent, an
investor who may only want to raise his portfolio to say 35 per cent, leaving
other shareholders in investment, is forced by the rule to bid for all remaining
shares, causing a panic of sale by other shareholders who otherwise would
have lived with a 35 per cent majority shareholder. In distinguishing takeover
law from the German Konzernrecht, the Konzernrecht addresses the problem
of control by defining control from a more material approach and not as a
percentage of shareholding as does takeover law. In a takeover situation, it is,
however, difficult to see a better way than by a mandatory rule. If it is left to
the market forces of demand and supply, minority shareholders may not even
have the remedy of selling their shares at a fair price. But a point not to be
ignored is the effect of acceleration of arbitrary control in the company caus-
ing a squeeze out of the minority who may not have the means to invest
elsewhere, thereby destabilising minority investment portfolios.
The mandatory rule also has the potential of limiting investment growth to
29.9 percent, as beyond that point, an investor must make a mandatory bid to
all the shares. Thus, small stake investors cannot invest beyond 29.9 per cent
unless they are financially sound to pay all the shares in a company. Other than
a condition of obtaining 50 per cent or more acceptances, rule 13 of the Code
limits an investor’s ability to attach conditions to the offer. Thus, if an investor
cannot comply with all the requirements, his option only lies in maintaining a
low share portfolio capped at 29.9 per cent and to sell his shares to a majority
and wealthier bidder.
A flexible application of the mandatory bid rule would protect the dual inter-
ests of the offeror and offeree. As the mandatory bid rule originated from the
55 Winter Report (2002) 49.
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UK, lessons could be learnt from the Takeover Panel’s historical approach.
Under the so-called self-regulation, the Takeover Panel applied the mandatory
bid rule in a flexible manner. For example, on 29 October 1987, less than two
weeks after the stock market crash, the Bank of England offered a rescue plan
to underwriters who had agreed to buy shares of British Petroleum (BP), by
which the Bank of England offered to repurchase any and all partly-paid BP
shares from the underwriters.56 This plan had the effect of putting the share-
holding of the Bank of England to 36 per cent, which in accordance with the
City Code would have required the Bank of England to make a mandatory
offer to all investors. Applying a flexibility approach, the Takeover Panel
agreed that, if the bank of England were to purchase the shares and thereby
reach a 36 per cent stake, it would not be required to make a mandatory offer,
provided the Bank of England agreed to vote only 29.9 per cent of its share-
holding.57 This flexibility served the dual interests of the offeror’s acquisition
of shares and offeree’s protection from arbitrary control.
But because the protection of minority shareholders at EU level is only in-
cidental to the objective of facilitating corporate restructuring, and not a pro-
tection for its own sake, this flexibility is best confined to national level. Even
at national level, in implementing the Takeover Directive, this kind of flexi-
bility has to give way to wider EU interest. Indeed, the UK’s Takeover Panel
lost this flexibility when it transformed from self-regulator to statutory reg-
ulator. This so-called flexibility is capable of rendering takeover rules uncer-
tain. To avert this uncertainty, whilst the Takeover Panel may change the rules
in the CityCode, section 944 of the Companies Act 2006 now requires that the
Panel publishes such changes first. As such, the flexibility that would allow the
Takeover Panel to suddenly change the rules, thereby causing uncertainty, has
been limited.
Parties who cannot or do not wish to pay the highest price paid in the
previous 12 months,58 would have to stagger their acquisition beyond 12
months. For example, in Gilgate Holdings Ltd,59 a number of parties bought
shares in a manner that was against the spirit of the rule, and yet they were
not found to be in breach of the rule. These parties bought 29 per cent of the
shares at 22.5 pence per share, and after 12 months plus one day they bought
more shares equivalent to 7 per cent at only 8.75 pence per share. Enforcing
56 See Chris Muscarella and Michael Vetsuypeus, ‘The British Petroleum Stock Offering:
An Application of Option Pricing’ (1989) 1 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 74,
77–80.
57 T Tridimas, ‘Self-regulation and investor protection’ (1991) 10 Civil Justice Quarterly
24, 30.
58 Article 5 of the Takeover Directive.
59 Reported in Takeover Panel Statement on 14th March 1980.
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the mandatory bid required the concerted parties to offer to pay only 8.75
pence per share, being the highest price they had paid for shares in the last 12
months. This loophole is not covered by the City Code in its present form
and is not covered by the Takeover Directive as implemented by the Com-
panies Act 2006.
IV. Equal treatment of shareholders and information disclosure
Takeover rules, especially on equal treatment and information disclosure, offer
better protection to minority shareholders, albeit a protection based on mar-
ket fairness as opposed to strict legal rights, than accorded under mainstream
company law. This can be appreciated by briefly examining the position of
minority shareholders in English law. From the common law perspective,
minority shareholders have always had very little protection. First, the power
to manage the business of the company is given to either the majority share-
holders in the general meeting or the board of directors via the articles of
association;60 but this power is traditionally reserved for the board of direc-
tors.61 There is less minority protection here.
Secondly, the directors who manage the company are not answerable to the
shareholders but to the company itself.62 The traditional statutory power of
the shareholders to manage the business of the company is to appoint and
remove directors from office;63 even then, the practical dimension of this
limited power lies with the majority shareholders in the general meeting,
which leaves the minority less protected.
In the landmark case of Foss vHarbottle,64 common law showed that minority
shareholders were less protected from mainstream company law perspective.
Two points emerged in this case. First, where there is an alleged wrong on the
company, the proper claimant is the company itself and not the aggrieved
shareholder. Secondly, if the majority approved of the act of the directors,
the minority shareholder could not be heard in court. Gradually, this common
law lack of adequate protection of minority shareholders changed. The courts
60 Automatic Self-Cleaning Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cuninghame [1902] 2 Ch 34.
61 Harold Holdsworth & Co (Wakefield) Ltd v Caddies [1955] 1 WLR 352; Under the
former TableARegulations Article 70 (1985), the business of the companywasmanaged
by the directors who exercised all the powers of the company – this still apply by default
under section 20 of the Companies Act 2006.
62 Percival vWright [1902] 2 Ch 421 –Directors do not, in general, owe any contractual or
fiduciary duty to shareholders.
63 Section 168 of the Companies Act 2006 – requires a majority vote by ordinary reso-
lution.
64 (1843) 2 Hare 461.
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have acknowledged the lack of protection given to minority shareholders.
Indeed, in the words of Hoffmann:
. . . the emancipation of minority shareholders is a recent event in company law. For most of the
twentieth century minority shareholders were virtually defenceless, kept in cowed submission by
a fire-breathing and possibly multiple-headed dragon called Foss v Harbottle. Only in exceptional
cases could they claim protection of the court. . . . A statutory remedy was provided for the first
time in 1948 but this proved relatively ineffectual. It was not until 1980 that Parliament forged the
sword . . . section 459 of the CA 1985 [now section 994 CA 2006] and which enables the unfairly
treated minority shareholder to slay the dragon.’65
Whereas the statute offered some protection to minority shareholders, by
virtue of section 994 of the Companies Act 2006, this has not been without
its shortfalls. The principles of common law have time and again led the
interpretation of section 994 to the extent that the majority of minority share-
holders are looked upon to decide the fate of a minority within a minority.66 It
is perhaps due to the weakness of the common law that shareholder protection
became the iconic theme of the self-regulated takeover industry since 1968,
under the Takeover Panel, a body that governs takeovers in the UK, with the
emergence of the City Code on Takeovers. Aggrieved minority shareholders
with less protection under mainstream company law can now find an exit
remedy in the City Code where the company becomes a target of a takeover.
The introduction of the Takeover Directive reaffirms the rules in the City
Code as to the principle of equality of treatment of all shareholders during
takeovers.
In the UK, the rules on equal treatment of all shareholders during a takeover
period are contained in the City Code. The underlying objective of these rules
is to prevent the transfer of effective control through selective acquisitions at
inflated prices without offering the same terms to all shareholders.67 As re-
gards the principle of equal treatment of all shareholders during a takeover
period, the Takeover Directive introduced nothing novel but was modelled
after the rules in the City Code. The guiding principle underpinning the equal
treatment rule is that company law should be primarily enabling or facilitative
– which does not eliminate legal intervention – which includes the avoidance
of substantial market failure by providing mandatory provisions to protect
65 Robin Hollington, Minority Shareholder’s Rights (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1999)
Foreword [a Foreword’ by Lord Hoffmann].
66 In Smith v Croft (No. 2) [1987] 3 All ER 909, 942 (Knox J), the idea of paying regard to
the views of an independent majority of shareholders within a minority shareholders
who petition the courts in a derivative action was developed.
67 T Tridimas, ‘Self-regulation and investor protection in the UK: the takeover panel and
the market for corporate control’ (1991) 10 CJQ 24, 32.
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shareholders.68 This is reflected in the Companies Act 2006,69 enabling the
Takeover Panel to make rules, includes rules on equal treatment of sharehold-
ers, as contained in the City Code.
In the UK, under the City Code, the principle of equal treatment for all
shareholders has two limbs: equivalent offer value extended to all sharehold-
ers, and same information to be given to all shareholders. The rules on equiv-
alent offer value are detailed and extensive enough to offer equal treatment to
all shareholders. The rules in the City Code on equivalent offer value include:
same terms of offer to all holders of the same class of shares; same terms of
revised offer; if acquired by cash then extend cash offer to all; if shares are
acquired by exchange of shares then the bidder must extend exchange of share
offer to all; comparable offers to all; appropriate offer to all; no special deals for
some; and all entitled to revised offer.70
As to providing same information to all shareholders, the rules are equally
comprehensive in order to accord equal treatment. The rules in the City Code
on disclosure of information include: accurate information; board to take
responsibility for information; timely information; to requiring of the giving
of same information to competing offerors; requiring sufficient information
dissemination by the boards; detailed financial information; and up to date
information.71
The rationale of the City Code is the equality of access to the market as
between institutional investors and their private counterparts, the protection
of the minority, and the prevention of the pressure to tender.72 To the extent of
its comprehensiveness in regard to the rules, and in terms of achieving equal
treatment of shareholders, the City Code surpasses most regulatory rules
elsewhere, including regulations in the USA.73 But this equal treatment is
confined to takeovers, as English company law does not impose a duty on
directors to treat shareholders equally, but to have regard to the need to act
fairly as between members of the company.74 A similar duty to act fairly as
between members, akin to English fiduciary duties, is seen in the German
Konzernrecht. Given thatmostGerman companies aremembers of Konzerne,
68 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy – Final Report (DTI, London July
2001) 5.
69 Section 943 of the Companies Act 2006.
70 See City Code rules 6.1, 6.2, 11.1, 11.2, 14, 15, 16, and 32.3, respectively.
71 See City Code rules 19.1, 19.2, 20.1, 20.2, 23, 24 & 25, and 27.1.
72 Panel answers to DTI inquiry of July 1974, cited in MAWeinberg and MV Blank on
Takeovers and Mergers (4th edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 1979) 569.
73 See DA DeMott, ‘Current issues in tender offer regulation: lessons from the British’
(1983) 58 NYUL Rev 945, 983–987.
74 Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006.
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the Konzernrecht arguably offers broader minority protection to such com-
panies – which is why the Konzernrecht is applied independently from take-
over law. In takeovers, the equal treatment rule is designed to protect minority
shareholders against unfair market practices.
At EU level, it was argued that the concept of equal treatment has no legal
justification, that the concept cannot be viewed as an application of the general
principle that companies have a duty of equal treatment of shareholders, be-
cause it involves horizontal relationship between the shareholders and Euro-
pean company laws have no principle imposing equal treatment horizontally.75
This raises the question whether takeovers should be discussed as a matter of
securities law (with its emphasis on ‘soft-law’) or company law (with its
emphasis on ‘strict-law’). Whereas takeover bids would be considered to be-
long to securities law in most Member States, the EU deals with it from the
apparent angle of company law.76 But the fact that, unlike the draft directive
that was titled as the ‘thirteenth company law directive,’ the final version of the
takeover directive was not title as such, raise doubts as to the nature of the
Takeover Directive being of company law as opposed to securities law.77 As to
equal treatment of shareholders, the seemingly lack of legal justification is
covered by how the Takeover Directive is implemented and interpreted. To
bring equal treatment in line with the rigours of the ‘strict-law’ nature of
company law, the Takeover Directive requires an EU Treaty interpretation.
Equal treatment then becomes a method of facilitating the restructuring of
companies to create an internal market that ensures freedom of establishment
of companies and free movement of capital.78 At EU level, this is arguably an
example of how takeover rules have the effect of altering the understanding of
mainstream company laws.
Discussing takeovers from securities law perspective, there is a market argu-
ment that it is wasteful to legislate on takeover activities if only to achieve
equal treatment of shareholders. The authors of this theory argued that share-
holders need not be treated equally in particular takeover transaction, because,
by diversifying their investment portfolios, investors may protect against the
75 Enriques, ‘The Mandatory Bid Rule in the Proposed EC Takeover Directive: Harmo-
nization as Rent-Seeking?’ In Ferrarini and others (eds)Reforming Company and Take-
over Law in Europe (OUP, Oxford 2004) 767, 790.
76 Eddy Wymeersch, ‘About techniques of regulating companies in the EU’ in Guido
Ferrarini (ed) Reforming company and takeover law in Europe (OUP, Oxford 2004)
150.
77 See Hirte and Heinrich, Commentary on the German Securities Acquisition and Take-
over Act (WpÜG), 2010, Introduction, marginal no. 79 et seq.; with regard to conflict-
of-laws questions Josenhans, ZBB 2006, 269, 279; with regard to this question in general,
see also Berding, WM 2002, 1149 et seq.
78 Article 26 TFEU (ex Article 14 TEC).
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risk of consistently falling on the losing side of unequal treatment.79 The
authors argued that if the market can even out apparent inequality in this
way, the costs of unneeded rules to promote equality might well be thought
socially wasteful.80
In response to this market argument, it is argued that the total portfolios of
most individual investors are so small that they are unlikely to achieve ad-
equate diversification through direct investment in shares and that adequate
diversification is difficult to achieve in the light of the difficulty of determining
in advance what investments might be subject to some degree of unequal
treatment in an acquisition transaction.81 Thus, a legal company law style
response via the Takeover Directive affirming the long-standing principle of
the City Code should be seen as the most appropriate protection of minority
shareholders’ interests. One of the aims of the equal treatment principle is to
remove the risk of minority suffering the use of ‘front-end loaded’ tactics.82
Thus, at EU level, this incidentally protects minority shareholders whilst
facilitating corporate restructuring. This protection is only incidental and
confined to takeovers because equal treatment of shareholders is not a general
principle of EU law.83
V. Squeeze-out and sell-out rights of shareholders
The squeeze-out right is the right of the majority shareholder to compulsorily
purchase the shares of the minority shareholder.84 For a minority shareholder,
what is at stake here is the property rights represented by the shares he maybe
unwilling to sell. In English law, ‘shares in a company are personal property.’85
A share, as a personal property, is ‘the interest of the shareholder in the
company measured by a sum of money, for the purpose of liability in the first
place, and of interest in the second, but also consisting of a series of mutual
covenants entered into by all the shareholders inter se in accordance with s 16
79 Easterbrook and Fischel, ‘Corporate control transactions’ (1982) 91 Yale LJ 698, 712–
714.
80 Easterbrook and Fischel, ‘Corporate control transactions’ (1982) 91 Yale LJ 698, 708–
711.
81 DeMott, ‘Current issues in tender offer regulation: lessons from the British’ (1983) 58
NYUL Rev 945, 983.
82 Guido Ferrarini (ed) Reforming company and takeover law in Europe (OUP, Oxford
2004) 753.
83 See Case C-101/08Audiolux SA and others v Groupe Bruxelles Lambert SA (GBL) and
others [2009] ECR I-9823.
84 Article 15 of the Takeover Directive.
85 Section 541 of the Companies Act 2006.
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of the Companies Act 1862 [s 33 Companies Act 2006].’86 The problem is that
the squeeze-out right is imposed on the minority shareholder not by the
‘mutual covenants’ contained in the articles of association but rather by law
external of the bargains the shareholder made when he acquired the shares.
A further problem the minority shareholder faces is even where his right to
keep his shares are provided by the articles of association, this right can be
altered by a majority vote, which alteration will be binding on him even when
he protests. On the other hand, commercial practice in takeovers is to treat
minority shareholders who refuse to sell when offered a fair price as free
riders. In anticipating an increased post-takeover share value, shareholders
may hold out during the bid, and hope to sell at a later stage, creating the free
rider problem. The law’s response, favouring the majority, is to clear the
market of free riders, furthering the corporate restructuring objective, by
facilitating the bidder in squeezing-out the minority shareholder. The
squeeze-out allows the bidder to overcome the free rider problem.87 These
rights have long existed under UK company laws, and the implementation of
the Takeover Directive simply restates with minor changes the old provi-
sions.88
The historical position in English law was such that a company that made an
offer for another company’s shares had no power to compel any shareholder to
part with his holding against his will.89 This common law position changed
with the enactment of the Companies Act 1928.90 Subsequently over the years
the right of squeeze-out, together with the right of sell-out, were fully ce-
mented in English company law.91 A restatement of these rights, taking into
account the recommendations of the Company Law Review,92 and for the
purpose of implementing the Takeover Directive, is contained in the Compa-
nies Act 2006.93
86 Borland’s Trustee v Steel Brothers & Co Ltd [1901] 1 Ch 279 at 288 per Farewell J.
87 MBurkart and F Panunzi, ‘Mandatory bids, squeeze-out and the dynamics of the tender
offer process’ in G Ferrarini and others (eds)ReformingCompany and Takeover Law in
Europe (OUP, Oxford 2004) 737, 793.
88 Sections 974 to 991 of the Companies Act 2006 restate provisions in Part 13A of the
Companies Act 1985, incorporating recommendations of the Company Law Review
2001, and in line with the Takeover Directive.
89 See Re Castner-Kellner Alkali Co Ltd [1930] 2 Ch 349; and Re Hoare & Co Ltd [1933]
All ER Rep 105.
90 Section 50 of the Companies Act 1928; later section 209 of the Companies Act 1948 –
imposed an equivalent of a squeeze-out right to compel a remaining minority share-
holder to sell his shares to a successful bidder.
91 Part 13A of the Companies Act 1985.
92 See Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy – Final Report (DTI, London
July 2001) 292.
93 Sections 974 and 991 of the Companies Act 2006.
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It is here that protection of minority shareholders at both EU and UK levels
seem to take an approach that seems to ignore property rights of the recipients
of that protection. It seems, whilst seeking to facilitate fairness in takeovers,
the protection of minority shareholders is only incidental to the objective of
facilitating corporate restructuring. Thus, the squeeze-out right renders obso-
lete the property rights of minority shareholders. At the EU level, the Winter
Report, having considered the enigma, argued that without a squeeze-out
right, takeover bids are less attractive to potential bidders – because of the
costs and risks relating to the existence of minority shareholders after the bid.
The Winter Report concluded that, so long as the squeeze-out right applies
only when the minority is fairly small and appropriate compensation is of-
fered, its use to address public interests, is proportionate.94 It is difficult to see
how forcing a minority shareholder out of the company against his will there-
by creating concentrated share ownership makes takeovers attractive to po-
tential future bidders. At the UK level, the Company Law Review Steering
Group saw the minority’s plight as follows:
Aminority shareholder, without control over the company, and most probably without any ready
yardstick against which tomeasure the value of his shares, the strength of his bargaining position is
in any event based solely on his ability to refuse to sell. We do not think that it would be possible to
devise . . . sufficient safeguards to protect a minority shareholder’s interests, to justify depriving
him of the one card of value he retains in his hand.95
Paradoxically, even though the UK’s Company Law Review Steering Group
recognised the infringement of property rights that a compulsory squeeze-out
creates, could only empathise with the plight of minority shareholders. The
Winter Report found that various courts in the Member States had ruled that
the squeeze-out right was not to be regarded as incompatible with property
rights, as the squeeze-out right is not exercised to satisfy private interests only
but public interests. Although squeeze-out rights have long been accepted as
part of UK and EU company laws, it does not only seem to infringe minority
property rights, but also renders minority shareholding an illusory right. But
studies show that the notion that shareholders’ ownership rights run counter
to a squeeze-out is today mostly no longer accepted, instead, the law caters for
only the purely financial interest of the minority, whilst averting the danger of
hampering the efficiency of the market for corporate control.96
It seems, the squeeze-out right of a bidder who has either acquired, or con-
tracted to acquire, 90 per cent or more of the shares carrying voting rights in a
94 See the Winter Report (2002) 61–62.
95 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy – Final Report (DTI, 2001) 283 –
emphasis added.
96 M Siems Convergence in Shareholder Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2008) 209.
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given class of shares,97 cannot be defeated on ground that the minority share-
holder does not wish to sell his shares. UK courts have, under the old statutory
regimes, only looked at applications resisting compulsory purchase if founded
on grounds that the offer was unfair; but even then the courts have not fav-
oured such applications.98 Moreover, the onus is on the minority shareholder
to prove that the offer was unfair.99 The test of fairness is not on whether it is
fair for a minority’s property rights and liberties of investment to be removed,
but on whether the price offered to the minority shareholder in return is a
commercially acceptable offer price. However, the compulsory purchase is
only restricted to takeovers.100 Thus, fairness in takeovers is all about econom-
ics, not law – the law’s intervention is only an economical dimension applied to
maintain commercial usage.
As a matter of economics, of fairness, the fairness of the price to be paid for
compulsory purchase in takeovers is accessed via a mechanism of legal pre-
sumptions. The acceptance of the offer price by the majority is evidence that
the price was fair. The test is this: ‘where the statutory majority have accepted
the offer, the onus must rest on an applicant to satisfy the court that the price
offered is unfair.’101 The highest price paid to the accepting shareholders is
presumed to be a fair price, which is paid for the squeeze-out purchase. Where
the pre-bidmarket price is higher than the offer price, the minority is bound to
take the offer price. It is unlikely that the majority would accept an offer less
than the pre-bid market price. But even if the majority accepted a lower price,
the minority would not be less disadvantaged than the majority, for both
receive the same price.
Unlike in other jurisdictions, English law does not require the price paid for
squeeze-out to be not lower than the pre-bid market price.102 The fact that
English law on the squeeze-out price is based on the offer price accepted by
the majority, rather than the pre-bid price, to some extent, demonstrates the
acceptance of the right of the majority to expropriate the minority.
97 Article 15.4 of the Directive.
98 In Re Bugle Press Ltd [1961] Ch 270, 276–277 Buckley J said: ‘where the 90 per cent
majority who accept the offer are unconnected with the persons who are concerned
with making the offer, the court pays the greatest attention to the views of that ma-
jority. In all commercial matters, where commercial people are much better able to
judge of their own affairs than the court is able to do, the court is accustomed to pay the
greatest attention to what commercial people who are concerned with the transaction
in fact decide.’
99 Re Gierson, Oldham and Adams Ltd [1968] Ch 17.
100 Re Bugle Press Ltd [1961] Ch 270.
101 Re Press Caps [1949] Ch 434 at 446 per Wynn-Parry J.
102 Ferrarini and others (eds) Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe (OUP,
Oxford 2004) 642.
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Outside economic analysis of the law, the squeeze-out right is hardly equi-
table. Take for example, a company that started off as a one-man private
company, increased its value over the years and changed to a public company,
then listed to trade its shares on a regulated market. A takeover bidder comes
along and acquires 90 per cent of the shares. A minority shareholder and
founder of the company who wish to retain his investment in the company
for his retirement income, pleads to the law for his vested interests. In re-
sponse, the law is only concerned with whether a fair price has been offered to
him. It is an indifferent legal response tominority plight for public commercial
interests. If that were the law’s response in protecting the private vested inter-
ests of this minority shareholder, he would be horrified at the manner of
protection accorded to him. In the end, the acceptance of the squeeze-out
right in company law is in effect a promotion of public commercial interests
at the expense of protecting the private investment interests of minority share-
holders who may not wish to give up their vested shareholding.
Moreover, if the shareholder being squeezed out should sacrifice his property
interests for the public good tomake takeovers attractive to future bidders, it is
difficult to see how that rationale is justified. The bidder will in turn hold 100
per cent shares, turning the share structure of the company into a concentrated
ownership, which makes it the more difficult for future bidders. In structures
with one shareholder holding shares sufficient to carry control of the com-
pany, future bidders have to pay him a high premium for a takeover to occur;
this is because ‘he has something to sell – control –which the others considered
separately have not.’103 It is argued that, in concentrated share ownership,
especially if shares are vested in a single shareholder after a bid, ‘an acquisition
will only occur when – and only when – the controller consents or has some-
how lost control’104 – hence, favouring a bidder to squeeze-out aminority does
not attract future bidders but rather repels them. Most of continental Europe
has for a long time had a concentrated share ownership structure, and so no
wonder many EU Member States found the squeeze-out right favourable.
Rather than the law’s indifferent response to the plight of minority share-
holder in whom there is no interest to sell his shares, a principle prohibiting
prejudicial conduct by a shareholder, should be developed. Under this sug-
gested principle, the conduct of a shareholder should not prejudice the inter-
ests of the company. Under this principle, a squeeze-out right should only be
applied if ‘the minority shareholder was in some way acting in a manner
destructive or highly damaging to the interests of the company from some
103 Short v Treasury Commissioners [1948] AC 534 at 546 per Lord Uthwatt.
104 Allen Ferrell, ‘Why Continental European Takeover Law Matters’ In: Ferrarini and
others (eds) Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe (OUP, Oxford 2004)
561, 562.
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motives entirely of his own.’105 In assessing a shareholder’s conduct, the test
should be subjective and regard should only be had to the personal conduct of
the shareholder in question. There is nothing in the Takeover Directive that
precludes developing a measure applying the squeeze-out right in the manner
suggested. The courts of equity would be accustomed with this body of prin-
ciples. But the current UK practice militates against a minority successfully
claiming unfair treatment.106
Infringement of property rights aside, there is an issue of classes of shares.
The Takeover Directive is silent as to the treatment of classes of shares in
calculating the threshold for launching a squeeze-out by the offeror. Most
Member States (for example, Belgium, France, Germany and The Nether-
lands) have a general threshold with no division into classes of shares.107 The
UK operates a class-based approach for calculating the threshold for the
squeeze-out right of the offeror.108 The class-based approach is more favour-
able to minority shareholders, as it offers a protection commensurate with the
level of class rights.
For example, where the target has two classes of shares, A and B, with the
former accounting for 98 per cent and the latter two per cent, a minority
shareholder with 12 per cent of the class B shares can prevent the offeror from
fully exercising his squeeze-out right, as the offeror will fail to reach a 90 per
cent threshold in class B shares. The difficulty in achieving the squeeze-out
right does not deny theminority shareholder the sell-out right, as the minority
has the option of tendering his shares during the offer period.
So far on the foregoing, it is clear that minority shareholders are a venerable
class of investors who therefore need protection. It is argued here that the
change of corporate control power from the offeree shareholders to the
offeror is essentially a majority shareholder transaction, as the bid will only
be successful if the majority accept. This majority transaction, coupled with
the potential control power battle between the offeree board and the offeror,
is likely to turn the minority shareholder into a victim. Besides a minority
who is reluctant to exit the company, it is to this new circumstance that
takeover law intervenes, by way of sell-out rights accorded to the minority
shareholders. The sell-out right is the right of the minority shareholder to
105 Re Bugle Press Ltd [1960] 3 All ER 791 at 796 per Lord EvershedMR – the ratio in this
case was on the determination of improper use of a squeeze-out right and not how the
right should be applied, the latter is the argument in this article.
106 Re Bugle Press Ltd [1961] Ch 270; Re Chez Nico (Restaurants) Ltd [1992] BCLC 192;
Fiske Nominees Ltd v Dwyka Diamond Ltd [2002] 2 BCLC 123.
107 C Elst and L Steen, “Balancing the Interests of Minority andMajority Shareholders: A
Comparative Analysis of Squeeze-out and Sell-out Rights” (2009) ECFR 391, 415.
108 Section 979 of the Companies Act 2006.
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compel the majority shareholder to purchase the shares of the minority share-
holder.109
It should be noted though that, minority shareholders are not protected on
every change of control in the company. Changes of control can occur in a
number of ways, and other events that trigger a change of control could result
in changes of policy, such as a change in the company’s business activities, and
could also have a detrimental effect on the minority shareholders.110 It does
not follow that the law protects minority shareholders each time there is a
change of control. In English company law, other than in a takeover situation,
the law does not offer the same protection to minority shareholders.111 In
takeovers, the real goal of the mandatory bid is not so much the one of
protecting minority investors from any change in control, but rather from a
change in control when the resulting ownership structure of the corporation is
characterised by the presence of a large block-holder.112 As such, the Takeover
Directive adds little, for it protects at change of control, giving the minority a
sell-out exit strategy, which leaves a need for a more comprehensive minority
protection regime.
Even in takeover situation, the sell-out right is not all roses for minority
shareholders. First, the offeror may fail to reach the 90 per cent threshold that
triggers a sell-out right for the minority, leaving the minority who wish to exit
the company locked therein. Second, where the threshold is reached, the time
limit set for the minority shareholder to exercise a sell-out right, being ‘any
time before the end of the period within which the offer can be accepted,’113
may be somewhat short. Where the sell-out right is triggered shortly before
the close of the bid, the minority shareholder will have a short time to consider
the fairness of tendering.
If there be any consolation for a minority shareholder wishing to exercise a
sell-out right, but for the limitation on the window of time in which to do so,
the UK position in calculating the threshold favours the offeree than the
offeror. Whereas treasury shares are excluded in calculating the threshold
for a squeeze-out right,114 treasury shares are included in calculating the
109 Article 16 of the Takeover Directive.
110 J Payne, “Minority shareholder protection in takeovers: A UK perspective” (2011)
ECFR 145, 151.
111 See Re Astec (BSR) plc [1998] 2 BCLC 556.
112 Marco Ventoruzzo, “Takeover Regulation as a Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Taking UK
rules to Continental Europe” (2008) University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business
Law 135, 140.
113 Section 984(2) of the Companies Act 2006.
114 Section 974 of the Companies Act 2006.
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threshold for a sell-out right.115 This gives a higher protection to the minority
shareholder to exercise a sell-out right than it does for the majority bidder to
exercise a squeeze-out right.
Further, the calculation for squeeze-out excludes the bidder’s shares held at the
start of the offer, but these are included in the threshold for a sell-out right.116
As such, the threshold to exercise a sell-out right is easily reached to allow an
exercise thereof to facilitate an exit.
VI. Compulsory acquisition clauses in articles of association
Besides takeover regulations, there is an equivalent to squeeze-out right that
can be provided for in the articles of association. In the UK, way before the
squeeze-out regime in takeovers was in place, there were cases at common law
where it was equitable to compulsorily acquire the shares of a minority share-
holder. At common law, compulsory acquisition was largely dependant on the
power provided in the articles of association. It was established at common
law that compulsory acquisition clauses in articles of association are valid and
enforceable.117 The question then is where they exist, whether these compul-
sory acquisition clauses in articles of association could in effect achieve the
same purpose as that of the squeeze-out right in takeover law.
Majority of the compulsory acquisition clauses have a lower threshold, usually
75 per cent, than the threshold in takeover law at 90 per cent. These have
advantages for both the majority and the minority shareholders. For the ma-
jority, these compulsory acquisition clauses attract bidders who would other-
wise find a higher threshold difficult to achieve, whilst for the minority share-
holders, they can simply benefit from the premium share price secured by the
majority acceptance of the offer.
Compulsory acquisition clauses can be provided in the articles of association
from the outset. Where that is the case, the clauses are enforceable as a matter
of a statutory contract.118 InPhillips vManufacturers’ Securities Ltd, where the
articles of association provided for a compulsory purchase of members’ shares
on passing a resolution to that effect, the Court of Appeal rejected an appli-
cation by a shareholder for an injunction to restrain the company from en-
115 Section 983(5) of the Companies Act 2006.
116 See Palmer’s Company Law Annotated Guide to the Companies Act 2006 (London:
Sweet and Maxwell, 2007) 724.
117 Phillips v Manufacturers’ Securities Ltd (1917) 86 LJ Ch 305, 116 LT 290.
118 Section 33 of the Companies Act 2006; Hickman v Kent or Romney March Sheep-
breeders’ Association [1915] 1 Ch 881; Rayfield v Hands [1960] Ch 1;Wood v Odessa
Waterworks Co (1889) 42 Ch D 636.
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forcing the articles against him. If the provision is already in the articles, then
we can assume the minority shareholders undertook to be bound by it when
they bought shares into the company.
It is also permissible to alter the articles afterwards to provide for a compul-
sory purchase provision. In Sidebottom v Kershaw Leese & Co Ltd, it was
observed that such a provision could be added on the alteration of the ar-
ticles.119 If this right has to be inserted on alteration of articles, the law provides
an array of rules aimed at protecting the minority shareholders. These include
the rule to alter the articles ‘bona fide for the benefit of the company as a
whole,’120 a higher threshold to alter articles affecting class rights,121 rules on
weighted votes when passing alteration resolution,122 and non binding effect of
alteration that increases a member’s liability to contribute to the company’s
share capital without that member’s agreement.123 In Germany, there are sim-
ilar provisions permitting alteration of articles, but not explicit for the aktien-
gesellschaften, as section 23(5) AktG permits articles to be altered only to the
extent specifically permitted by the AktG – for example, section 203 AktG
permits for the authorisation in the articles to issue new shares to be substi-
tuted for the resolution on the share capital increase.
In English law, the protection accorded tominority shareholders is reflected in
the emphasis on requiring the alternation to be for the benefit of the company
as an entity. In Brown v British Abrasive Wheel Co Ltd,124 the court refused to
allow a compulsory purchase that subjectively benefited the majority rather
than the company as an entity. In Dafen Tinplate Co Ltd v Llanelly Steel Co
Ltd,125 the court refused to allow an alteration of the articles that would enable
the majority to compulsorily purchase shares of any other member. In Dafen
Tinplate Co Ltd, the court found that the majority were confusing their own
interests with the benefit of the company as a whole.126 In Sidebottom v
Kershaw Leese & Co Ltd,127 the court allowed an alteration of the articles to
include a provision for the majority to compulsorily purchase the minority
shares, having found that the alteration was bona fide for the benefit of the
company as a whole.
119 [1920] 1 Ch 154 at 162 and 170 per Lord Sterndale MR and Warrington LJ.
120 Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa [1900] 1 Ch 656 at 671 per Lindley MR.
121 Section 630 CA 2006; Cumbrian Newspapers Ltd v Cumberland & Westmoreland
Printing Ltd [1987] Ch 1.
122 Bushell v Faith [1970] AC 1099.
123 Section 25 CA 2006.
124 [1919] 1 Ch 290.
125 [1920] 2 Ch 124.
126 [1920] 2 Ch 124 at 141 per Peterson J.
127 [1920] 1 Ch 154.
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The application of these English cases compared with the provisions in Take-
over Directive at EU level (implemented by Part 28 of the Companies Act
2006) seem contradictory, as the latter seem to allow expropriation of minority
shareholders without the requirement of bona fides required in the former. A
closer examination of these cases indicates that the cases are concerned with
matters of internal management of the company byway of rules governing the
‘horizontal’ ongoing relationship between shareholders inter se via alteration
of articles, whilst Part 28 of the Companies Act 2006 is concerned with ex-
ternal management of the company by way of rules governing restructuring
the status of shareholders via takeovers.
This calls for an answer to the question whether a compulsory purchase clause
in the articles achieves the same results as a squeeze-out right in takeover law.
It should be noted that there are no overlaps between the right to compulsorily
purchase amember’s shares via a power to alter the articles under section 22 and
via the squeeze-out under section 984 of theCompaniesAct 2006 (Article 15 of
the Takeover Directive), as the two serve different objectives. The cases exam-
inedshowarestrictionontheformer,asthepowertoalter thearticles isprimarily
to govern the relationship between shareholders inter se and not to terminate
their status per se. The later serves an economic benefit and a public interest in
restructuring of companies.Moreover, takeovermechanism contains a range of
protections for shareholders that are not present in alteration of articles. To
allow restructuring to be achieved via an alteration of the articles would cir-
cumvent the protections for shareholders contained in those mechanisms.128
In takeovers, it is common for the bidder to wish to acquire all of the shares of
the target company so as to have complete freedom in running the acquired
business without the need to negotiate withminority shareholders.129 Thus the
rules, ensuring a fair price is paid to the minority shareholder, provides for a
squeeze-out right. But whether this is achieved via the alteration of articles to
provide a compulsory purchase right or via takeover mechanism the effect is
the same to a minority shareholder who is reluctant to take an exit route. The
harsh effect of either is that compulsory purchase of shares seems to be con-
trary to contractual relationship created by the nature of shares.130 Compul-
sory purchase goes against the argument that the permanency of investment is
a hallmark of the corporate form.131 In all this, ‘the issue is whether the ma-
128 B Hannigan, ‘Altering the articles to allow for compulsory transfer – dragging minor-
ity shareholders to a reluctant exit’ (2007) JBL 471, 498.
129 B Hannigan, ‘Altering the articles to allow for compulsory transfer – dragging minor-
ity shareholders to a reluctant exit’ (2007) JBL 471, 473.
130 See O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 2 BCLC 1 at 14.
131 Kraakman et al, The Anatomy of Corporate Law (2004) 139–144, 60’; Re Bird Pre-
cision Bellows Ltd [1984] 3 All ER 444 at 449–450 (affirmed [1985] 3 All ER 523).
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jority shareholders can bring to an end the minority’s very status as a share-
holder.’132 The law here could be seen as undermining the permanence of
investment, rendering it a temporary investment that can be set aside by the
majority at will.
It is argued that the rules in takeovers are not per se on the nature of share-
holding but rather on facilitating restructuring of companies and ensuring
fairness in so doing. The legislators having predetermined the first limb of
Allen, for a proper purpose, the question then is whether the compulsory
purchase is on a fair price. Moreover, in general law, a fair price could take
into account the proportion minority shares bear on control, for ‘it is not
unfair to offer a minority shareholder the value of what he possesses, i.e., a
minority shareholding.’133 Hence, in takeovers, a fair price calculated on the
basis of the highest price paid in the last 12 months,134 without discounting
minority shares, could be generously fair. As to ownership rights, the interests
of minority shareholders in remaining in the company is overridden by public
interest that lies in corporate restructuring for a wider economic purpose.
Further, evenoutside takeovers, a compulsorypurchase via alterationof articles
can be aligned with the wider economic purpose of corporate restructuring,
provided a fair price is paid.Alterationof articles that seeks to expropriate other
shareholders, according to theAustralian case,Gambotto vWCPLtd,135would
only be justified if it was done for a proper purpose and not oppressive. The
Australian court inGambotto attached much weight to the proprietary nature
of a share – that is, shares aremore than a capitalised income stream.ButEnglish
courts have not adopted this approach and seem to accept that shares can be
expropriated as long as a fair value is paid.136 A similar approach taken in
Germany accepts that shares can be expropriated as long as adequate compen-
sation is paid, as is regarded by the German Federal Constitutional Court.137
‘An alternative perception of the share is to see it as a “capitalised dividend
stream” which entails that, provided the compensation paid to the shareholder
being expropriated results in no diminution in his investment return as com-
pared with holding on to the share, there has simply been no prejudice.’138
132 B Hannigan, ‘Altering the articles to allow for compulsory transfer – dragging minor-
ity shareholders to a reluctant exit’ (2007) JBL 471, 491.
133 Re Grierson, Oldham & Adams Ltd [1968] Ch 17 at 35 per Plowman J.
134 Article 5 of the Takeover Directive.
135 (1995) 182 CLR 432.
136 See judgment of Lord Hoffmann in O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092.
137 See the judgment BVerfGE 27. 4. 1999 –
1 BvR 1613/94, E 100, 289 and the preceding judgment 7. 8. 1962 – 1 BvL 16/60, E 14,
263.
138 DD Prentice, ‘Alteration of articles of association – expropriation of shares’ (1996)
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VII. Conclusion
This article has argued that the UK takeover system offers a better protection
to minority shareholders than accorded at EU level. This is especially seen in
the board neutrality rule and the equal treatment principle. At EU level, it
noted that a major task in the Takeover Directive is to strike a balance between
on the one hand the objective of facilitating corporate restructuring through
takeover activities, and on the other hand the need for protecting the interests
of minority shareholders, with the latter being incidental to the former.
This article argued that the protection of minority shareholders, at EU level, is
only a method aimed at creating an internal market as an area without internal
frontiers in which freedom of establishment of companies and free movement
of capital is ensured. To this end, takeover law, which treats unfair treatment of
minority shareholders as a barrier to restructuring of companies, seeks to
ensure that investors are free to put their money into shares of EU companies
in order to establish themselves in another Member State and to provide
necessary capital for the development and expansion of those companies. To
achieve this, takeover rules provides for a mechanisms such as equal treatment,
mandatory bid, and squeeze-out.
This article noted that much as the mandatory bid rule is meant to prevent
arbitrary control if bidders would freely buy shares, the rule is arguably capa-
ble of escalating arbitrary control in cases where the offeror intended only to
raise his portfolio to slightly over the threshold. The other negative effect of a
mandatory bid is the destabilising of minority investment portfolios, where a
squeeze-out right is subsequently triggered. The article noted however, it is
difficult to see a better way than by a mandatory rule, for if it is left to the
market forces of demand and supply, minority shareholders may not have even
the remedy of selling their shares at a fair price. The law’s protection of the
minority is to provide an exit strategy at a fair price.
On the particular exercise of the squeeze-out right, the article noted that the
right accords with the argument that takeover regulation is not about protec-
tion of minority shareholders per se, but about facilitating the objective of
corporate restructuring, with the former only a method of achieving the latter.
It noted that squeeze-out rights goes against the permanence of share holding,
and trumps minority shareholders’ property rights. It noted that, both at UK
and EU levels, in takeovers, the interest of minority shareholders in remaining
in the company is overridden by public interest that lies in corporate restruc-
turing for a wider economic purpose. The ultimate protection for minority
shareholders is the law’s response of ensuring that a fair price is paid to the
shareholder. This article concludes that, minority protection in takeovers is
about market fairness and not about property or legal rights per se.
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